Last Updated: 2012-07-10 22:21:57 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 2)
Overview of the July 2012 Microsoft patches and their status.
|#||Affected||Contra Indications - KB||Known Exploits||Microsoft rating(**)||ISC rating(*)|
|MS12‑043||The well know memory corruption vulnerability in Microsoft XML Core Services (MSXML). Note that the updates for XML core services 5.0 are still missing.
Replaces MS08-069 and MS10-051.
|XML core services
|KB 2722479||The patch for the problem first described in SA 2719615. Is used according to Microsoft in limited targeted attacks.||Severity:Critical
|MS12‑044||The usual MSIE cumulative patch fixing an additional 2 vulnerabilities that allow random code execution with the rights of the logged on user.
|KB 2719177||No publicly known exploits||Severity:Critical
|MS12‑045||An vulnerability in ActiveX Data Objects (ADO), part of Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC), allows random code execution with the rights of the logged on user.|
|KB 2698365||No publicly known exploits||Severity:Critical
|MS12‑046||A vulnerability in how Visual Basic for Applications loads DLLs allows random code execution with the rights of the logged on user. This is one more in a long list of bulletins that are related to Security Advisory 2269637.
This can be attacked through webdav or other file sharing methods.
Note that -as is usually the case with VBA- there might still be vulnerable VBE6.dll files lingering on patched systems as Microsoft does not patch all vulnerable dll's installed by third parties.
||Is used according to Microsoft in limited targeted attacks.
Symantec confirms exploitation.
|MS12‑047||Multiple vulnerabilities in the windows kernel mode drivers allow escalation of privileges.
|Windows kernel mode drivers
|KB 2718523||No publicly known exploits; Microsoft claims CVE-2012-1890 was publicly released.||Severity:Important
|MS12‑048||A vulnerability in handling file and directory names allows random code execution.
Can be exploited by as little as opening an attachment of an email.
||No publicly known exploits||Severity:Important
|MS12‑049||A TLS protocol vulnerability relating to CBC cyphers that allows the encryption to be broken. Relates to the Windows Secure Channel (SChannel) and the Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG) components.
Replaces MS10-049, MS12-006 and MS10-085.
||Microsoft claims CVE-2012-1870 is public and that proof of concept code was released.||Severity:Important
|MS12‑050||Multiple vulnerabilities in Sharepoint, InfoPath and Groove Server allow escalation of privileges.
CVE-2012-1858 was already discussed and fixed in MS12-037 and MS12-039 last month.
||CVE-2012-1858 was publicly discussed and fixed by Microsoft in last month's batch.||Severity:Important
|MS12‑051||Folder permission problems in Office for Mac 2011 allows other users to cause unsuspecting users to execute code unintentionally. This upgrades Office 2011 for Mac to version 14.2.3 .
|Office for Mac
||Microsoft claims the vulnerability was publicly discussed.||Severity:Important
|Less Urgent||Less Urgent|
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY
- We use 4 levels:
- PATCH NOW: Typically used where we see immediate danger of exploitation. Typical environments will want to deploy these patches ASAP. Workarounds are typically not accepted by users or are not possible. This rating is often used when typical deployments make it vulnerable and exploits are being used or easy to obtain or make.
- Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time to test.
- Important: Things where more testing and other measures can help.
- Less Urgent: Typically we expect the impact if left unpatched to be not that big a deal in the short term. Do not forget them however.
- The difference between the client and server rating is based on how you use the affected machine. We take into account the typical client and server deployment in the usage of the machine and the common measures people typically have in place already. Measures we presume are simple best practices for servers such as not using outlook, MSIE, word etc. to do traditional office or leisure work.
- The rating is not a risk analysis as such. It is a rating of importance of the vulnerability and the perceived or even predicted threat for affected systems. The rating does not account for the number of affected systems there are. It is for an affected system in a typical worst-case role.
- Only the organization itself is in a position to do a full risk analysis involving the presence (or lack of) affected systems, the actually implemented measures, the impact on their operation and the value of the assets involved.
- All patches released by a vendor are important enough to have a close look if you use the affected systems. There is little incentive for vendors to publicize patches that do not have some form of risk to them.
(**): The exploitability rating we show is the worst of them all due to the too large number of ratings Microsoft assigns to some of the patches.
Swa Frantzen -- Section 66
Last Updated: 2012-07-10 22:10:12 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 1)
Microsoft Security Advisory 2719662 announces the availability of a fix-it to disable windows sidebar and gadgets. The threat seems to be insecure gadgets that allow random code to be executed with the rights of the logged on user.
The fix-it disables the sidebar and gadgets.
Swa Frantzen -- Section 66
Last Updated: 2012-07-10 22:04:01 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 1)
Microsoft Security Advisory 2728973 announces that Microsoft is revoking trust in a number of Microsoft certificates. A list of 28 Microsoft intermediate certificates are placed on an untrusted list.
The updat eis cumulative in that it also places previously problematic certificates in the untrusted store.
Swa Frantzen -- Section 66
Last Updated: 2012-07-10 17:13:19 UTC
by Rob VandenBrink (Version: 1)
Johannes Ullrich was our MC for the evening. He covered off where the ISC came from, the major data collection projects we have ongoing (Dshield Firewall logs, the 404 Project and the Web Honeypot). He also covered off many of the major stories that we’ve seen over the last 12 months.
Russ McRee discussed DDOS attacks against Microsoft as well as service abuse against cloud offerings
Rob VandenBrink - The Microsoft Root Certificate compromise/abuse story was pretty big, along with the follow-on windows update to fix windows update. This is something that's been predicted - - it’s been a part of SEC504 and SEC560 for some time now, and really they should have been more prepared for something like this.
Related to that - SSL support on most browsers do not correctly use the CRL (Certificate Revocation List) - only Opera correctly uses the CRL. So while the "correct" fix for the Microsoft issue would have been to revoke the affected certificate, only Opera would have correctly used that fix !
Manuel Humberto Santander Pelaez highlighted SCADA attacks in South America, as well as the challenges SCADA hardware faces in having to support the legacy protocols and co-exist on general purpose networks. We had a deeper discussion on this after the panel discussion, with some different issues and viewpoints from the Oil and Gas sector thrown in. SCADA was a big part of the evening, both in the follow-on Q and A, and the after-panel-panel.
- Mobile malware is rapidly on the rise
- With mobile platforms being pushed by both users and management, we’re seeing admins “giving up” on real security for BYOD
- Again related to BYOD, the network perimeter is no longer easy to define. We’ve got external devices, not owned by the corporation that now demand internal access
- With new protocols (IPv6 for one), we're seeing all the old attacks becoming new (and successful) again
- Many of our new web app problems aren't new. Most of our web apps don't do anything against the newer attacks, we've got our hands full keeping up with the old stuff
- We tend to solve problems that have easy fixes, one thing at a time, ignoring problems that need multiple solutions to actually solve
- Focus on pentest is only looking at one face - mechanisms for defense of web apps are simply not being deployed
- For instance, look for hash compromises next year - we're still not hashing correctly
- We’ve seen a rise in hacktivism over the last while - these folks often don't have budget, they just have time on their hands and the will to succeed
Lenny Zeltser discussed the impact of PCI - for all that many view it as "the minimum bar" for security rather than as a demanding standard, it has had a marked, positive impact on the state of internet security, especially on smaller businesses
But PCI compliance still gives a false sense of security, again, especially to smaller businesses. While it raises awareness, many of them view their security as a solved, completed problem with PCI certification done.
Security products need to become more intelligent, more automated and cheaper – what’s custom and expensive now needs to become automated, smarter, commodity products
William Salusky covered off his top 5:
- spear phishing, targetted at and originating from AOL
- compromised accounts - specifically webmail accounts. targetting financial data, contact lists, leverage compromised pwds against other things (like bank and financial sites)
- hacktivism - not politically motivated, each hactivism group want to be "better” than the last hactivism group. Most aren't particularly political, this phenomena seems to be more of a "We're badder than Lulzsec" one-upmanship thing
- More discussion on certificate authorities and the recent compromises
- Lots and lots (and lots) of malicious advertising has been seen this year - ads with malware embedded / drive by compromises
Lots of questions followed on, notably several on malware and especially several SCADA questions
After the panel, the fun continued with a good after-after-panel discussion ranging over some future SDN (Software Defined Networking) compromises and resourcing issues, what we can see coming on AVB (Audio Video Bridging) compromises, lots on web app security and defense, and a truly great software demo that we can’t really disclose (but stay tuned)